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THE DEPRESSION YEARS Series ends in September 1939 with Canada's commun-
ists reeling from the double-whammy of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and Canada's 
war declaration. Relishing the communists' discomfort and the vindication of 
his organization's own long anti-communist crusade, RCMP Intelligence 
Officer Charles Rivett-Camac reported the Communist Party's "profound 
confusion," "despair," and "disbelief" Manitoba communist MLA James 
Litterick spoke for many when he admitted that the pact had shaken the party 
to its "very foundations." Rivett-Camac reported that language section mem-
bers, most of all the Jewish and Polish comrades, were devastated. And yet, 
he added, the Party's "rigid faith in the Soviet Union" was holding it together. 
Indeed, it was emerging from the chaos "practically intact, and, in some 
respects, stronger than ever." As the memoirs of participants attest, his portrait 
of communist confusion was accurate. His estimate of the party's speed of 
recovery, however, may have been designed to remind the political elite not 
to become complacent about the communist threat or be taken in by the party's 
"false patriotism and misleading slogans" (the party continued to support a 
"war on two fronts" position). Was the popular front simply what the RCMP 
declared it to be: a monumental confidence trick? Or did it contain sufficient 
promise to make the CPC's last pre-war demonstration of subservience to 
Soviet raison d'etat a tragedy? 
Canadian Security Intelligence Survey (CSIS), July to September 1939. The Bulletins 
appeared in this quarterly form between January and September 1939. 
THE DEPRESSION YEARS, PART V 
The Force, Fascism, and "Anti-Fascism " 
Much of the Force's sense of vindication at the exploding of the popular front 
myth stemmed from resentment at having been forced to divert some of its 
attentions to what it considered the non-existent threat of domestic fascism. 
Before 1937 the Bulletins referred to this subject almost exclusively in the 
context of the communists' an/i'-fascist propaganda. In 1936 they mentioned 
Canada's most prominent fascist leader, Adrien Arcand, on a single occasion: 
when he invited Québec labour unionists to desert the international unions, 
which were run by a "pack of Jews and Communists." During 1937, however, 
as the major capitalist democracies accelerated their rearmament programmes 
and the fascist states crowned a string of politico-military triumphs by signing 
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Department of External Affairs evidently de-
cided that it would be wise to possess information on potential fascist fifth 
columnists and prodded the RCMP towards the surveillance of Arcand's 
National Social Christian Party (NSCP) and a handful of other groups. The 
Force's first report on domestic fascism appeared in the 17 February 1937 
Bulletin, and thereafter the "Report on Revolutionary Organizations" was 
retitled "Report on Communist and Fascist Organizations." 
Before Canada's war declaration the RCMP dismissed the idea that home-
grown fascism represented any threat to Canada or to democracy. By compar-
ing fascist and communist influence, organizational strength and subversive 
capacity, it ruled the fascist movement "still in its infancy," "at a standstill," 
"at a very low ebb," in a "process of disintegration," "retrograding both in 
membership and financial strength." Only Arcand's NSCP and its successor 
the National Unity Party (NUP), enjoyed significant popular support. It had 
perhaps 6000 members, of whom over 5000 lived in the province of Québec, 
mainly in Montréal (though one report mentions a huge growth of fascist 
support in Sorel, site of the province's fiercest class battles in 1937). The status 
of the prairie sections was summed up by the NUP's Manitoba headquarters 
— a "lean-to shed." All sections outside Québec suffered from inadequate 
leadership and a susceptibility to schism. The Ontario organization, for exam-
ple, was driven by old-fashioned Protestant-Catholic sectarianism. Even the 
NSCP was disrupted by a serious split, when Arcand's two right-hand men, 
J.E. Lessard and Gabriel Lambert, broke away in May 1938, in protest at the 
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dictatorial tendencies of "the chief." When almost all the fascist groups united 
in the NUP in July, Arcand remained totally dominant. 
Not only did the Force fail to detect any evidence of subversive intent, but 
in its original report it characterized the NSCP as a natural outgrowth of 
Québec conditions and a useful counter-balance to communism. This unthreat-
ening image of the NSCP/NUP may have been influenced by the knowledge 
that Lessard, the commandant of Arcand's paramilitary "Blueshirts," was a 
former Mountie. Apart from one report hinting at possible links between 
Joseph Farr's Ontario NUP section and the German Ministry of Propaganda, 
the RCMP could find nothing to suggest any intercourse between Canada and 
the Axis powers; it waited until war had actually been declared before 
discovering evidence of Arcand's disloyalty. When stories about fascist 
gun-running into Canada appeared in the national press in spring 1938, the 
RCMP reported that they were "totally without foundation." Some military-
style drilling was being carried out, but "without arms" and solely to instil 
pride and discipline. Having excused this criminal offence, the RCMP 
endorsed the fascists' assertion that the stories were no more than communist 
mischief-making designed to increase popular revulsion against fascism by 
building up an exaggerated picture of the domestic fascist threat. Later it 
claimed the stories had been planted by the party's Control Commission (an 
organization it described as the Canadian equivalent of the Russian GPU), and 
suggested that the press' willingness to print them was further evidence of the 
reach of the communist octopus. 
With its openly admitted relationship to the Comintern and endless admi-
ration for the Soviet Union, the CPC seemed by far the likelier source of fifth 
columnists. To remind External Affairs of where the real threat lay, the RCMP 
accompanied its rebuttal of the gun-running rumours with some quotations 
from Dimitrov's 1935 speech to the Seventh Comintern Congress, revealing 
that the Comintern remained pledged to struggle for "the overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie and the establishment of the power of the proletariat." The 1938 
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Bulletins generally show an increase in anti-communist editorializing. Any 
development that appeared to discredit the party was pinpointed: rumours of 
financial improprieties in the disposition of Aid to Spain funds; disaffection 
among returning members of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion; the unhap-
piness of non-party members at their role in front groups; the CCF leadership's 
continuing hostility to cooperative action. And when party leaders appeared 
to let slip the moderate veil, the Force underlined that here were the party's 
real intentions. Readers were directed to A.E. Smith's "interesting" remarks 
on the "galvanic education" that the members of the Mackenzie-Papineau 
Battalion were receiving from their political commissars, and which would be 
"very useful ... when the Spanish struggle is over." When Stewart Smith 
offered an audience at the Toronto YMCA the standard party line on the 
ongoing Moscow trials — the USSR was "perfectly justified" in taking 
appropriate action against "wreckers and spies" — the Force described his 
answers as "evasive" and all the more insidious because the audience found 
them convincing. Tim Buck reportedly told the same audience that, in the 
event of a war in which Canada and Russia were on opposite sides, he would 
have to support the workers' stale. 
Every exhortation communist leaders uttered to rank-and-file members to 
become more "Canadian" and every consequent display of moderation be-
came proof of cunning manipulation. When communists started meetings with 
"O, Canada" and finished them with "God Save the King"; when they used 
"milder" slogans and removed from placards and banners "ridiculing carica-
tures of an objectionable nature" (and deprived the police of an opportunity 
for arrests); when they flew the Union Jack and Stars and Stripes at anti-war 
marches — they were shamelessly gulling the public. The peace rallies the 
League for Peace and Democracy organized in Toronto, Winnipeg, and 
Vancouver to commemorate Britain's 1914 war declaration drew particular 
.scorn. After labelling the "so-called" rallies as non-events, the RCMP railed 
against this latest expression of the party's "pseudo-struggle against war and 
fascism" and its attempt to "hoodwink the public into believing that the 
defence of Democracy is its purpose." The Force was delighted when many 
rank-and-file communists defied the party's official policy of ignoring the 
royal visit in spring 1939. However, it was oblivious to the damage its report 
of bolsheviks enthusiastically cheering the new King and Queen like regular 
Canadians did to its monolithic image of the party. 
"Bulletin ä880, 5 January 1938. The RCMP made no comment on the elder Smith's 
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For Peace and Democracy 
For all the Bulletins' didacticism, they contained little real analysis of the 
impact of the popular front on the party and the mass movement. Indeed, 
nowhere in the Bulletins was there a simple description of what the party meant 
by the popular front. So what did it mean? Eric Hobsbawm's image of 
"concentric circles," with a "united working class" forming the inner core of 
the struggle for the "unity of all democratic forces," captures its essence. 
Membership of the "outer circle" (which also, of course, contained all the 
members of the "inner circle") was open to virtually every Canadian. Since 
all white-collar workers and most professionals, merchants and petty com-
modity producers (farmers, fishermen) were being driven towards the "con-
ditions of life of the proletariat," most members of the middle-class were 
eligible. They were not part of the capitalist class, which consisted of the 
owners and top managers of the 35 monopolistic corporations — out of 11 ,(XX) 
enterprises — which controlled the Canadian political economy to the detri-
ment of everyone else. Apart from these few thousand monopolists, only the 
followers of Leon Trotsky, who served "the interests of fascism," were 
proscribed. The "Democratic" front's immediate objective was a centralized 
welfare state in which a federal government dominated by "progressives" 
would enhance its powers and use them to protect the interests of the most 
vulnerable (the unemployed, industrial workers seeking to organize, small 
farmers, poor provinces, municipalities stretched tight by welfare costs), 
defeat the threat of domestic "fascization," and support a "positive peace" 
policy. All of these goals would be realized by peaceful means, through the 
mobilization of broad but limited federal and provincial electoral pacts. An 
independent CPC, however, was still needed to guide the democratic front 
towards its ultimate destination: socialism. That final goal — the fulfilment 
of the "democratic unification" begun by William Lyon Mackenzie and Louis 
Papineau 100 years earlier — would not come by force but only with the 
consent of the Canadian people. Suggestions to the contrary were "alien" to 
the CPC. "̂  
Party life was recast in line with democratic fashion. Although major policy 
decisions remained more centralist than democratic, comrades embroiled in 
the day-to-day issues were regularly taking decisions outside the direct control 
of the "higher bodies" and in doing so trying to practice the democracy they 
preached. They, and even more the new recruits from the broader movement, 
Buck, "General Secretary's Report to the Thirteenth Dominion Executive 
Committee Session, June 1938," in A Democratic Front for Canada (Toronto undated), 
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expected no less from their leaders. An intense wave of "self-criticism" — 
only partly Russian in inspiration —swept over the leadership, which pledged 
to eradicate a bureaucratic, undemocratic, overly demanding, and even "bul-
lying" style of work that seemed perfectly designed to frighten away new 
members. "Wc must outlaw use of the word 'must'!" Sam Carr told the 
Dominion Executive Committee (DEC) in June 1938. Before that DEC 
session, all leading national and provincial cadres had their political and moral 
probity "verified" by the Control Commission. The authoritarianism of party 
"vigilance" was mitigated by its egalitarianism: no one escaped, least of all 
the members at the centre. "While we respect the personal life of our Party 
members," the Control Commission pointed out, "moral looseness ... espe-
cially by a leader of the Party, undermines his ability to serve our cause" and 
could become a means of discrediting the party. 
As they entered more fully into the movement and their communities, many 
communists became aware of the party's limitations and perceived the ration-
ality in the popular front. For all that the CPC was immeasurably more popular 
than ever before, it still encountered widespread mistrust and hostility in the 
working class, let alone among the middle class. The call to abandon sectari-
anism, join the movement, and become part of a native radical tradition 
incorporated a conscious attempt to alter the popular image of communism as 
a way of life. Conforming to social norms and conventions in discourse, 
personal behaviour, and appearance was not a sell-out, but simply the neces-
sary means by which communists would be taken seriously (and not, as had 
often been the experience of the first Canadian bolsheviks, as "freaks") when 
they attempted to mobilize their communities around the construction of a 
sidewalk or a railway crossing or an extension of rural mail delivery. Nothing 
revealed more clearly their anxiety to be judged on society's terms than the 
rejoicing that now accompanied every "breakthrough" on the "electoral 
front." The bedrock of party members' growing success in winning official 
positions in the labour unions and trades and labour councils was respect for 
their abilities as workers, then a combination of organizing ability — including 
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an ability to present a well-argued case — and staunchness: "if you come on 
a job and start putting up a fight for conditions, the men don't give a shit 
whether you're a communist or an episcopalian." Their politics, on the other 
hand, especially now that organized anti-communist tendencies such as the 
CCF and Catholic Action were emerging, were a potential source of disunity 
and therefore weakness. Many activists kept their political and union identities 
in discrete pigeonholes. 
Young communists embraced the popular front style with particular enthu-
siasm, ready "to grasp any suggestion, method, program or activity" and "sit 
with the devil himself to advance their aims. Peter Hunter has stressed their 
idealism: 
It was not a Russian plot when we called for slum clearance projects. It was 
not subversive when we called for a national youth programme on recrea-
tion, physical fitness and recreation rather than military training. It was not 
just youthful exuberance which made hundreds of young people picket 
stores selling Japanese goods. 
As this comment suggests, many effectively abandoned the party for the 
"movement," even at times neglecting the trade union work in which the 
Young Communist League (YCL) had always been conspicuously active. 
Work in and for the party suffered. Who wanted to attend alienating branch 
meetings that more often consisted of dues collection and a routine distribution 
of "tasks" than conformed to the ideal: "interesting, short, free of dull routine 
and full of lively political discussion during both the 'business' and 'educa-
tional' periods?" Falling attendance at branch meetings and the loss of "that 
old spirit of voluntary work for the party" caused concern. Since many of 
the most politically able and developed local cadres preferred leading roles 
"in any organization but our Party," branch leadership was often indifferent. 
This broader style of work produced one troubling complication. Members 
who engaged in "mass work" inevitably encountered contrary ideological 
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influences. The party responded, somewhat paradoxically, by enforcing 
stricter ideological discipline, partly by means of "vigilance campaigns" and 
exemplary expulsions. The Control Commission, however, was not the 
NKVD, and control was more commonly exercised through political educa-
tion. During the late 1930s education became a panacea for all party ills — it 
would raise the general political level of the membership, train new cadres, 
invigorate branch life — and a means of extending links to the wider move-
ment though the provision of schools for non-party members. Most impor-
tantly, it would help local officials become more thoroughly familiarized with 
the party viewpoint, more capable of promoting it where they worked and 
socialized, and better prepared to resist radical critique. The party was 
particularly worried that rank-and-file members would be seduced by Trot-
skyism. Although it labelled Trotskyism a "petty-bourgeois opportunist" 
deviation, it was worried about being outlefted by the Trotskyite "bacteria" 
and "scum" in direct action struggles among the unemployed or in fighting 
the fascists on the streets, areas where its own tactics were becoming more 
moderate. A primary object of internal political education was to "destroy 
the last remnants of Trotskyism in Canada." Students who examined Russian 
bolshevik history, for example, would learn the difference between a "revo-
lutionary" party and a "r-r-r-revolutionary" party. 
The great leap forward in educational work came in 1937, when the first 
National Training School (NTS) opened. The entire party was activized 
around preparations for the NTS, with each district asked to raise special funds 
to support it and submit appropriate candidates for the first enrolment. By 1938 
most provincial and major city sections had established formal cadre schools, 
and the party made its educational apparatus accessible to sympathizers in the 
trade unions and other sections of the Democratic Front by launching several 
city Labour Colleges with courses ranging from trade union history to Marxist 
economics to public speaking and journalism. Party teachers did not adopt 
a disinterested liberal approach. Large dollops of the party line made up most 
of the diet, whether in the branch or the NTS. Students encountered Marx, 
^*Bulletin »895. 6 July 1938. 
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Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in selected gobbets and were exposed to bourgeois 
authors only when absolutely necessary. Through "study outlines" and "con-
trol questions," they were pointed towards the most important questions and 
told the official answers. A study of the Comintern, for example, revealed that 
Stalin was continuing Lenin's lifelong struggle against "revisionism and 
deviations," confirmed the correctness of the Seventh Congress decisions, and 
established the "changed role of Trotskyism from a political trend in the 
working class to an unprincipled group of wreckers acting in alliance with 
fascism." Similar methods were used to disseminate the message of Stanley 
Ryerson's key 1937 text 1837: The Birth of Canadian Democracy. Reworked 
for the purposes of mass political education through a course on "Canadian 
Traditions," it placed the party programme at the end of a democratic contin-
uum started by the 1837 rebels and rededicated the party to the peaceful 
completion of the struggle against the "new Family Compact." 
This is not to say that party education only consisted of dogma and 
indoctrination and was therefor»-*^orthless. It spoke to the demands of un-
known numbers of working-class Canadians for expanded educational oppor-
tunities, brought out the talents of many who might otherwise have been lost 
in the depression, and gave rank-and-file members an intellectual confidence 
that enabled them to shine at, and sometimes carry, union meetings (though 
some independently minded unionists also found them glib and inflexible). 
Moreover, not all students were uncritical vessels. They often complained that 
their courses were too "crammed" and that they wanted more time to discuss 
what they were reading. Unimpressed by the poor preparation of their teachers 
and the poor learning materials they were expected to use, students at the 
Regina city school in March 1939 turned out of necessity to primary research. 
Walter Wiggins, a veteran activist in various party farmers' organizations, 
"haunted the libraries" for several fruitless days before turning up a treasure-
trove of material on the Saskatchewan farmers' movements that would "be of 
32 real value to the Communist Party as a whole." Such initiative hinted at 
middle and lower-level cadres' capacity for the creative application of Marx-
ism to the social transformation of Canada. 
29 
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For every student who shared Wiggins' belief in the value of party educa-
tion, however, probably at least two saw it as one more task to divert them 
from the real struggle. Even the middle-class cadres in the closed clubs of 
Montreal's "Section 13" rarely had time to devote themselves to serious 
Marxist study (which helps explain why the "simple, unqualified, dogmatic 
catechisms" of Stalinist Marxism fit the bill so well). If members could fit 
training in Marxist theory into their packed diaries, so much the better. But 
the really important thing was the struggle of the moment. A list of the most 
important late popular front struggles would include: Aid to Spain and China; 
protest against Duplessis' Padlock Law; the struggle to expose Hitler's treat-
ment of the Jews and to pressure Ottawa for a more liberal policy on the 
admission of refugees; peace rallies — and rallies against the Chamberlain 
"sell-out"; the organization of white-collar unions; physical combat to drive 
the fascists from the streets (which moderates could silently applaud even if 
they could not join); cultural work; electoral mobilization behind progressive 
candidates; and myriad unheroic interventions in the community. The overall 
project also embraced the party's continuing class struggles to build the CIO, 
politicize the trades and labour councils, dissolve sectional barriers inside the 
working cla.ss, and, crucially, maintain the unity of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations and Trades and Labour Congress. This interlocking network of 
campaigns helped to extend and strengthen working-class organization and 
built valuable alliances across class boundaries. 
In appealing for inter-class unity, the party often targeted men and women 
with religious convictions and felt no embarrassment at addressing them 
primarily in moral and ethical terms. "It was very easy to stir up the emotions 
of the people at that time," Jack Scott observed. Judaeo-Christian moral 
values featured as prominently in public left discourse as Leninism. Buck 
nevertheless observed the traditional pieties by claiming Lenin's authority 
when he denied that communism was "crass materialism" and attacked 
anti-clericalism as "anarchist phrasemongering." Contrary to a widespread 
misconception, he pointed out, there was a place for Roman Catholics at the 
popular front table. "We, Catholics and Communists," Buck insisted, had "the 
same warm, human sympathy and concern for the welfare of one's fellowman, 
the same generous desire for social justice and the same ardent aspirations for 
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a better life." As a serious comparison of Pope Pius XI's 1931 encyclical 
Quadrigessimo Anno and The Communist Manifesto would show, there was 
no reason why communists and catholics could not work together "to make 
our Canada a better Canada for all of us." 
Although Buck's bridge-building left the Roman Catholic church utterly 
unmoved, many United Church ministers and some from other traditions 
perceived the popular front as a revival of the Social Gospel. Well-known 
figures such as the Reverends Ben Spence and Salem Bland in Toronto and 
Samuel East in Regina lent visible legitimacy to meetings of the League for 
Peace and Democracy, the Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, the 
National Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, the Committee for the 
Boycott of Aggressor Nations, and even the party itself. They turned up in 
Toronto, Montreal, Regina, Edmonton, Vancouver, and — in the shape of a 
Mormon bishop — Drumheller. Some became actively involved in domestic 
struggles, notably in support of the unemployed. United Church minister 
Fern A. Sayles was moved more than most by the plight of the depression's 
victims. Speaking in defence of Welland's immigrant radicals in 1935, Sayles 
posed the question: "shall life or property come first?" The Reverend Robert 
Matheson from Vancouver joined him in choosing life. A regular sf)eaker on 
left-wing platforms, he was a notable ally of the unemployed during the 
tumultuous events of May-June 1938. When southern Ontario erupted in a 
new wave of protest at Mitchell Hepburn's latest relief economies in spring 
1939, the unemployed immediately looked to and received support from the 
church. But the ministers' greatest contribution was to strengthen the left's 
command of the moral high ground on the issue of peace and war. A leaflet 
Buck, "General Secretary's Report," in A Democratic Front for Canada, 35. The 
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issued in support of a Christmas boycott of fascist-made goods suggested that 
consumers — surely — would not want gifts that meant "terrible suffering to 
the people of Spain and China ... [or] the brutal persecution of the Jewish 
people by Nazi barbarism." A speaker who attacked the Roman Catholic 
church's role in the Spanish conflict did so on the grounds that it had betrayed 
"christian principles." 
Both party and movement benefited from the new approach. After a period 
of stagnation from late 1937 to mid-1938, party membership started to rise 
again during the Munich crisis. Many of the new intake were middle class. 
The party accommodated them in special sections and usually excused them 
from public activity, though not from normal branch life. It also gained a wider 
periphery of middle-class sympathizers who could be relied on for financial 
support if not consistent activism. Fund raising duly became easier. Appeals 
for Spain were often heavily over-subscribed, and even the drives of the 
permanently indigent Daily Clarion benefited (though not by enough to 
prevent its reversion to a weekly in summer 1939). The new fratemalism 
also facilitated work in the labour movement, especially in trades and labour 
councils. An RCMP informant in Winnipeg complained that not only was the 
labour council treating communist delegates with respect, but no«-communist 
members were actively participating in a range of political issues. Some had 
even attended "conferences held in protest against the foreign policy of Great 
Britain!" Communist organizers started to make progress among such 
"white-collar proletarians" as office workers, commercial artists, insurance 
salesmen, and journalists. On the electoral front there were definite signs, 
especially in the Ontario municipal elections, that a "labour progressive" 
coalition was not only taking shape but was capable of winning seats in 
"predominantly English speaking" areas. 
On numerous occasions the party demonstrated its ability to mobilize the 
"people," sometimes showing a theatrical flair that may have stemmed from 
*°Bulletin «907, 15 December 1938. 
Bulletin 0882, 27 January 1938. Interestingly, the individual who issued this rebuke 
was a visiting luminary, the British middle-class CPGB member and Spanish Civil War 
volunteer Ralph Bates. 
••̂ Weisbord, The Strangest Dream, 91-3; Bulletin 0897,4 August 1937 refers to a plan 
in Vancouver to allocate a special card to close sympathizers who would be embar-
rassed by being publicly identified as communists. Possession of the card would imply 
a more than voluntary financial obligation. 
'*^Bulletin 0882, 27 January 1938; Bulletin «892, 25 March 1938. 
**Bulletin 0892. 25 May 1938. 
Bulletin 0893, 7 June 1938. John Weir was secretary of the Toronto (Commercial) 
Artists' Union. 
*^Bulletin 0906, 30 November 1938; Bulletin 0907, 15 December 1938. 
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its ongoing involvement in such projects as the Toronto Theatre of Action. 
According to the RCMP, most of the 1800 Torontonians who participated in 
the CLPD's Peace Rally on 4 August were "drawn by the novelty" of a 
"torchlight parade.' The Force could not dismiss so easily the same organi-
zation's single most impressive mobilization, when Arcand's NUP held its 
founding convention in the city exactly a month before. The fascists met in 
Massey Hall, but the CLPD put them in their place by filling Maple Leaf 
Gardens with 10,000 anti-fascists. It was surely more than coincidental that, 
when the Western Division of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) met in 
Saskatoon two weeks later, communists received a respectful hearing. Empha-
sizing the left's commitment to open entry for Jewish refugees and the 
encouragement of Jewish culture, they invited the CJC to join the anti-fascist 
movement and, the RCMP concluded, "made considerable inroads" into an 
49 
organization that had hitherto kept them at arm's length. 
As the party struggled to root itself in a native radical tradition, it refused 
1837 rebels Samuel Lount and Peter Matthews, the Riverdale Park (Toronto) 
party club created a new tradition that merged the two tendencies. In 
promoting the Canadianization of its foreign-bom or descended members, the 
party's only concession to a still rampant nativism was to have some leading 
cadres change their names (Muni Ehrlich became "Jack Taylor," John Wevur-
ski became John "Weir," and so on). The party criticized ethnic organizations 
for remaining too "narrowly sectarian," too hesitant about engaging with their 
non-progressive compatriots and with the outside world, and urged their 
members to undergo the ordeal of naturalization. At the same time, however, 
it encouraged them to become the "foremost proponents and champions for 
the culture and rights" of their compatriots in Canada. Using the facilities 
*''Bulletin i898, 18 August 1938. 
^Bulletin #896,20 July 1938. Lita-Rose Betcherman's brief account of this rally offers 
a good example of "Cold War-liberal" scholarship. She writes: "Although the League's 
leadership had been infiltrated by communists, its active members included liberals, 
intellectuals and idealists and its public meetings drew ordinary men and women united 
by a common desire to stand up against current threats to democracy." Thus we have 
the loaded term "infilu-ate" (in respect of an organization the party had created); the 
implication that communists were quite apart from both "idealists" and "ordinary men 
and women," and a failure to appreciate that 10,000 protestors do not simply materi-
alize. See Tke Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 122-3. 
"'compare Bulletin #883, 9 February and Bulletin #899, I September 1938. See also. 
M. Muni, "Some Problems of Territorial Work." Party Builder, May 1939. 
'"'Toronto Celebrates Two Day Holiday," Daily Clarion, 1 May 1939. 
' ' UT, RKP, Box 2, folder 6, Paul Phillips, "Memorandum on the Work of the National 
Language Organizations," prepared for the 8th National Convention, CPC, 8-12 
October 1937; Bulletin #891, 13 May 1938. 
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of the Independent Mutual Benefit Federation (IMBF), it promoted inter-
ethnic solidarity through "increased leisure-time contact." Formed in 1934, 
the IMBF was dominated by Hungarians, Slovaks, and Germans but by 1935 
it also had Polish, Jewish, Italian, French-Canadian, and English-Canadian 
branches. Members of the smaller ethnic groups often used Hungarian social 
facilities. Class, ethnic, and national identities meshed together on May Day 
1938 in Winnipeg. Most of the 4500 marchers, including large contingents 
from three immigrant-based industrial unions, the Fur Workers, Ladies' 
Garment Workers, and Meat Packers, came from the ethnic communities, 
many underlining the fact by wearing national dress. What made this proces-
sion different from any that took place in the class against class period was 
that it was headed by a trade union delegation led by impeccably "native" 
Trades and Labour Council leaders. Grant McLeod and Robert McCutchan, 
and everyone marched behind the Union Jack. 
Restraining the Struggle? 
There were, however, definite tensions in the popular front. No matter how 
often party leaders insisted that the CPC remained a revolutionary party; no 
matter how often they urged members in the labour unions to "come out" 
openly as communists, a section of the rank and file clearly felt that the party 
was making too many concessions to democratic unity and pushed for a harder, 
more definably proletarian programme. At a CCLU meeting in Montréal, 
Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) leader J.A. Sullivan stressed that the best 
way to fight "reaction" was to build a "united labour movement." The next 
speaker, however, R.L. Calder, K.C., president of the Montreal's CCLU 
branch, pitched his appeal in clearer popular front terms, insisting that a 
"people's party" open to all manual workers, office workers, small merchants, 
and the middle class was the best medium of social change. Class tension was 
also evident at a meeting in Vancouver's First Baptist Church, held to discuss 
the Christmas Boycott of Aggressor Nations campaign. With the mainly 
middle-class platform (with speakers from the Women's Christian Temper-
ance Union, the Ministerial Association, and the League of Nations Society) 
content to pass resolutions calling on Ottawa, London, and Washington to 
embargo exports of war materials, a member of the audience intervened to 
disparage the passing of resolutions "of which no-one took any notice" and 
52 Carmela Patrias, Patriots and Proletarians: Politicizing Hungarian Immigrants in 
Intenvar Canada (Montréal 1994), 149-55, 224-5. 
"Bulletin 0891, 13 May 1938. 
^*Bulletin 0900, 15 September 1938; Bulletin 0907, 15 December 1938. The reference 
was to recent direct action to prevent the shipment of scrap iron to Japan. 
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exhort the meeting to "get out and form picket lines, as was done in 
Nanaimo." 
Centre-periphery differences were evident in the unemployed movement, 
which returned to national prominence as prairie drought and the deflationary 
policies of Ottawa and Washington sent relief numbers spiralling past the 
million mark. After playing a dominant role in unemployed struggles 
between 1929-35, the party gave them much lower priority during the indus-
trial recovery and CIO upsurge of 1936-37, attempting with a complete lack 
of success to persuade the Trades and Labour Congress to accept the affiliation 
of unemployed organizations and to lead a campaign for federal unemploy-
ment insurance and a slum-clearance and house-building programme. Never-
theless, the party remained the movement's single most influential force. The 
aim of the party centre in 1937 was to bring the unemployed into the popular 
front, "broadening" the movement — and necessarily controlling its militancy 
— by working through the churches and labour unions. The explosive 
situation that developed in Vancouver in the spring and summer, when the 
activities of the CPC-led Relief Project Workers' Union (RPWU) culminated 
in a month-long occupation of the central post office and art gallery, caused 
Toronto some concern. 
At issue in Vancouver was Premier T. Duff Pattullo's decision to close 
provincial forestry projects in April 1938, "six weeks earlier than in 1937. 
After that date the men would not be provided with relief of any kind. If they 
wanted to stay in the province, they would have to find work themselves. 
Otherwise, the government would pay their way back to their home prov-
inces." Most of the single unemployed who flooded into Vancouver in April 
had no desire to return to their home provinces; they wanted Pattullo to make 
good on his longstanding commitment to a policy of "work and wages" and 
they demanded to be treated not as "transients" but as citizens. The RPWU 
organized mass "tin-canning" expeditions with the explicit intention of filling 
the jails and forcing national attention on the plight of the single unemployed. 
Almost immediately, however, disagreements surfaced over how to dramatize 
the struggle. The party centre üned to exert restraint on the RPWU, but as it 
had often discovered, controlling the distant Vancouver comrades was no 
simple matter. Among the "younger" and more "irresponsible element" there 
James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare 
State 1914-1941 (Toronto 1983), 172-3. 
^Bulletin 0882,11 January 1938. 
Struthers, No Fault of Their Own, 192. This contains an excellent summary of the 
Vancouver events, which should be supplemented with Steve Brodie's short memoir, 
Irene Baird's evocative contemporary novel, Waste Heritage (Toronto 1939) and the 
reports in the present volume. 
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was support for turning the men loose "to survive on the roving band theory" 
or for a second On-to-Ottawa trek. Several leaders of the original trek, an 
RCMP informant observed, including Ernie Cumber, John Matts, and R.W. 
"Doc" Campbell, "were definitely entertaining the idea." However, it was 
"very doubtful whether the Communist Party has sanctioned the plan." 
Another 1935 veteran, Steve Brodie, returned from a period as a union 
organizer to take over the leadership of the RPWU. Although he too "often 
felt sympathetic to this adventurer spirit, ... party discipline said 'no' ... far 
from inciting the men. Party organizers [worked] against provoking confron-
tation." Suspecting that there was a police informer "at the leadership level 
of the [RPWU] and the Party fraction" (he discovered the person's identity in 
1942), Brodie improved security by reorganizing the RPWU on a "platoon 
system." The RCMP were taken completely by surprise by the major demon-
strations and occupations on 20 May (there was a shorter occupation of the 
Hotel Georgia). At all times a key objective was to maintain public activity 
and public support. During the month-long "sit-down," RPWU leaders con-
tinuously exhorted "the men to refrain from any action which might alienate 
public sympathy." 
The sit-down was widely supported. When it ended on 19 June, the violence 
with which Police Chief W.W. Foster's offices carried out the evictions 
generated an instant display of solidarity. Within hours 7000 protesters gath-
ered at the Powell Street grounds. Joining CPC provincial leader Fergus 
McKean were Helena Gutteridge and Harold Winch of the CCF, Mildred Lusk 
of the Vancouver Women's Council, and the Reverend R.N. Matheson of 
Collingwood United Church. At another meeting that evening, in the Moose 
Hall, the British Columbia Federation on Unemployment was formed, with 
delegates from the CPC (in several manifestations), CCF, trades unions, and 
rate payers' associations claiming to represent 14,545 members. Spontane-
ous demonstrations of support continued into the early hours of the following 
morning, and hundreds of unemployed strikers and sympathizers immediately 
travelled to Victoria, where they set up a peaceful picket of the legislature. 
After heated communications between Pattullo and Mackenzie King, a com-
promise settlement was brokered in early July, with the federal government 
agreeing to "pay the cost of relief for all non-resident transients, not simply 
those who had left the forestry camps," until they either returned home or 
^^Bulletin #888, 5 April 1938; Bulletin #891. 13 May 1938. 
'^Brodie, Bloody Sunday, 12. 
^Bulletin #892, 25 May 1938; Bulletin #893, 7 June 1938; Bulletin #894, 21 June 
1938; Bulletin #895, 6 July 1938. 
^^ Bulletin #895, 6 July 1938; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater: A Century of Labour 
in B.C. (Vancouver 1967), 119. 
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received a job offer through the Employment Service of Canada. Agitation, 
however, resumed as the winter of 1938-39 approached. When Pattullo 
re-opened the forestry camps in November, the RPWU objected to the inclu-
sion of a physical training requirement on the grounds this would lead to 
"military" training. 
Clearly, a policy of restraint did not necessarily mean a policy of inaction. 
Nor was Vancouver the only major centre to experience militant unemployed 
action. Relief recipients in Calgary, a city with a long record of party-led 
unemployed agitation, stopped work on cigf projects between 6 April and 19 
May in protest at a cut in food allocations. Thirty-three strikers and sympa-
thizers were arrested during the strike, including prominent party members 
Ann Lenihan and E.C. Hopper, president of the Central Council of Unem-
ployed Unions (CCUU). Militants on the CCUU bowed reluctantly to majority 
opinion when a vote was taken to end the strike on the city's terms; only four 
of its eighteen members voted in favour. There was a brief occupation of the 
main Regina post office in July, and only days after single men in Port Arthur 
formed an unemployed association, 400 members occupied the Public Utilities 
building and forced a rapid decision by the city council to grant them 
emergency meal vouchers, admit to the relief rolls all who could prove their 
residency, and sustain any man until his residency status was investigated. 
In Toronto, however, organizers were more attuned to the centre's general 
political priorities, and the party's tactics were markedly different. As an 
informant reported, it "docs not consider the time opportune to take a too active 
part... and is more or less allowing the unemployed to chart their own course." 
It refused to sanction a march on Ottawa or a high profile sit-down. Instead, 
it wanted to make the position of the single unemployed a key issue at the 
forthcoming municipal elections and hoped to mobilize the Single Unem-
ployed Men's Association (SUMA) during the campaign. As had happened 
elsewhere, however, the unemployed refused to be treated like a stage army. 
The party's habit of "agitating the unemployed men to the point where they 
were ready to take militant action and then restraining them from doing so," 
produced a loss of "faith" in its leadership. The SUMA found it "increasingly 
"Stmthers, No Fault of Their Own, 194. 
"Bulletin 0902, 11 October 1938; Bulletin #906, 30 November 1938. 
^David Bright, "'The Lid is Tight Now": Relations Between the State, the Unem-
ployed, and the Communist Party in Calgary, 1930-1935," paper presented to the 
Canadian Historical Association, Brock University, St. Catharines, June 1996. 
^^Bulletin m90. 3 May 1938; Bulletin #892, 25 May 1938. 
^Bulletin #896, 20 July 1938; Bulletin #905, 10 November 1938. 
Bill Purvis, "Recent Experiences on the Coast Unemployed Movement," Worker, 2 
September 1938. 
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difficult to recruit" new members, and few single men paid any heed when the 
party finally gave the green light for action and called on them to refuse to 
turn up for work at city relief projects. Ironically, Toronto had to import an 
organizer from Vancouver to keep the SUMA from falling apart. 
Changes in labour defence tactics also brought criticism from below. The 
leadership's much-heralded liquidation of the Canadian Labour Defence 
League did not meet with universal approval. Between 1935-38 the CLDL 
sat rather uneasily alongside a number of Citizens' Defence Committees, 
modelled on the original Regina Citizens' Defence Committee which had been 
created to give a more popular feel to the defence of the On-to-Ottawa 
Trekkers. In the spring of 1938, however, the party collapsed all defence work 
into the Canadian Civil Liberties Union (CCLU). Although the CCLU was 
formally independent, the party perceived it as an important component of the 
popular front, especially in Montréal where it managed to avoid the restrictions 
of Maurice Duplessis' 1937 Padlock Act. R.L. Calder, K.C., president of the 
Montréal CCLU branch and a leading non-communist popular fronter, had 
recently toured western Canada to publicize the horrors of the Québec legis-
lation, and his access to infiuential progressives resulted in supportive edito-
rials in virtually every major paper in the west. 
Dissidents, on the other hand, worried about losing party control and the 
apparent replacement of mass action with purely legalist methods. The bene-
fits the CCLU brought to some party members in Montréal did not mitigate 
the sense of grievance felt by several ethnic organizations at the CCLU's 
decision to defer taking action against the closing down of their halls until the 
federal government stated its position on the Padlock Law (which the Supreme 
Court finally ruled unconstitutional in 1957!). There were complaints in the 
traditional CLDL stronghold of Vancouver when Tom Ewan ordered its 
provincial office closed down and all its equipment sold, a decision that 
seemed curiously timed and shortsighted given the expectation of an eruption 
among the single unemployed. The CCLU did not appear to be the sort of 
^Bulletin m99, 1 September 1937; Bulletin #900. 15 September 1938; Bulletin «905, 
10 November 1938; Bulletin 1(907. 15 December 1938. 
John Manley, "From United Front to Popular Front; The CPC in 1936," introduction 
to Kealey and Whitaker, Depression Years, Part III, 4-6. 
UT, J.S. Woodsworth Memorial Collection, Box lOB, Jean Laing, circular letter re: 
"Citizens' Defence Movement of Toronto and District," 27 April 1936; John Manley, 
"'Communists Are Acting As Representatives of the Canadian People': The Commu-
nist Party of Canada in 1937," inü-oduction to Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker, 
eds., R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years, Part IV, 1937 (St. John's 
1997); Bulletin #889. 20 April 1938; Weisbord, The Strangest Dream. 69-73. 
Bulletin #884.7 Febmary 1938; John A. Dickinson and Brian Young, ̂ 4 Short History 
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INTRODUCTION 19 
defence organization that would be able to respond rapidly to the arrest of 
unemployed activists. 
Steve Brodie's experience lent weight to that suspicion. While recovering 
in hospital from injuries received during the eviction of the post office 
sit-downers, he was persuaded by three CCLU members to appeal for a writ 
against the crown, only to discover on release that, with his case subjudice, 
he was unable to speak about it in public. To make matters worse, it was then 
held up for over a year. Finally, with Canada at war, the lawyer the CCLU had 
assigned to it withdrew it without consulting either Brodie or the CCLU. "He 
somehow felt embarrassed," Brodie remarked, "about reminding the Canadian 
people that jackboot justice can be used on both sides of the Atlantic." A 
few months after this individual blow, the party experienced collective disil-
lusionment when R.L. Calder not only refused to become its "standard bearer" 
in Verdun during the Québec provincial election, but instead stood for the 
CCF.''* 
Perhaps the most unexpected criticism was directed at the party's trade 
union work. For the most part, the 1938 Bulletins record one success after 
another. The very first Bulletin contained news of a virtual party sweep in 
elections to all the key offices in the seven Toronto locals of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers Union (ACWU).'^ Thereafter, the litany included: the 
consolidation of the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) and the 
Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) as party strongholds; continuing communist 
influence in the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee (SWOC) and Mine-
Mill; the increasing respectability of communist trade union leaders, such as 
Harry Hunter, Dick Steele, Alex Welch, Fred Collins, Harold Pritchett, and 
Bruce Magnussen; tremendous advances in the trades and labour councils; the 
successful projection by the Daily Clarion of a "unity psychology"; and the 
party's triumphant domination of the TLC's Niagara Falls convention. With 
between 100 and 150 of the 550 delegates at Niagara Falls, communists made 
up at least one-third of a "progressive" bloc of around 315. TLC Vice President 
Dan Willie Morrison worked hand-in-glove with J.B. Salsberg, and even 
President Paddy Draper, who "in former years displayed a pronounced anti-
communist attitude,... favoured the communists and the progressive element 
''^Bulletin #888. 5 April 1938. 
^•'Brodie, Bloody Sunday. 17-8. 
^''"R.L. Calder Snubs Communists," War Series Bulletin, 13 November 1939, in 
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Series. 1939-1941 (St. John's 1989), 50. 
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on every occasion." At every turn the right-wing was comfortably outvoted. 
With barely suppressed triumphalism progressive and communist delegates 
presented their pet resolutions — on TLC-CIO unity, unemployment, repeal 
of the Padlock Law, the right to organize, aid to Spain and China, "quarantin-
ing the aggressors," and the immediate recall of parliament "to decide Can-
ada's policy in the event of a European war" — for the rubber stamp. 
Compared with the timidity the left had shown at the 1936 and 1937 conven-
tions, its aggression and boldness were remarkable. The whole event produced 
"considerable rejoicing" in the communist camp. 
Nevertheless, despite all these positive indicators of the party's forward 
march into the labour movement, organized labour itself had moved back-
wards in 1938, and it seemed to some that the party was partly responsible. 
Notwithstanding communist statements to the contrary, the drive for industrial 
unionism had slowed towards the end of 1937 and in 1938 was stuttering to a 
dead halt. The primary reason for this reversal was the changed balance of 
class forces brought about by the long recession that had started in late 1937. 
As unemployment soared, employers graspœd the opportunity to weed out the 
militants who had surfaced in 1936-37. The level of strike activity plummeted; 
rank-and-file workers became hard to organize, and many promising new 
unions foundered. Displaying old-fashioned voluntarism, some rank-and-
file communists awarded the party a portion of the blame. The most bitter 
criticism was heard in Montréal, where the party seemed in danger of frittering 
away much of its pioneering organizational work. Late in 1937 the Hospital 
Workers' Union had 700 members, half of them fully dues-paying; by June 
1938 only 40 paid-up members remained. An even worse situation prevailed 
in the steel industry. Delegates to the Montreal Trade Union Commission in 
February learned that workers at the Peck Rolling Mills were "completely 
disillusioned and have lost confidence in [SWCK!]." Three months later the 
same forum was informed that the steel union, which only months earlier had 
1000 members in Montréal, had "completely fallen to pieces." The reporting 
RCMP estimated that at least 102 delegates were party members. A report to the 
Edmonton party section gave a figure of 140-plus. Sec Bulletin #901, 29 September 
1938; Bulletin 0902. 11 October 1938. 
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Bulletin #894,21 June 1938, and compare them with reports from Montréal in note 79. 
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delegate "blamed the CP for allowing [this to happen] in so short a time" and 
recommended that the way back lay through building party shop groups at 
Peck's and other "concentration" plants. 
In June J.B. Salsberg visited Montréal for a special trade union conference 
of communist trade union officials and section organizers. He began his 
address by telling his audience that "with all its faults" the Montreal Trade 
Union Commission was the best in the party. He then stressed that the ongoing 
fight for labour unity was "our most important political task at the present 
time" and had to be achieved "at all costs." To this end, he offered advice on 
how communists should conduct themselves in the Montreal Trades and 
Labour Council and the Quebec Federation of Labour and in their daily 
relations with ordinary workers. Winning the support of the two bodies for 
labour political action was crucial. If they worked "carefully," Québec would 
give a vital lead "to the rest of the country in the formation of the democratic 
front." He called on every comrade, "particularly those active in the trade 
unions ... [to] mix more freely with the rank and file." The way to win them 
over to the progressive camp was to become more open. Communists should 
"not be afraid to admit" their political affiliations and should be prepared to 
bring in issues "from the floor ... and not from behind as many are prone to 
do." The centre would do its part by abandoning trade union fractions and 
replacing them with "industrial units." 
What Salsberg meant by "careful" was revealed in the party's continued 
deference towards the "progressive" labour bureaucracy. At one high-level 
meeting. Buck for no apparent reason raised the issue of the French CP's policy 
of restraining the demands of "the radical working masses" and justified it on 
the grounds that any other course of action might "divide the radical forces" 
of the centre-left. This criterion also seemed to apply under different 
circumstances in Canada. The party's boldness at Niagara Falls was only 
possible because of the caution it had displayed during the run-up to the 
convention. At the same time as the anonymous Montréal comrade was 
''^Bulletin #884, 17 February 1938; Bulletin «893,1 June 1938. 
^Bulletin «896, 20 July 1938. 
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berating SWOC and the party's part in its demise, Harry Hunter and Dick 
Steele were boasting of the steel union's achievements in Ontario and thanking 
Pittsburgh for its support.*^ When rank-and-file Cape Breton miners and 
steelworkers aired sharp criticisms of SWOC and UMWA officials (like Dan 
Willie Morrison), the party executive "clung to the unity policy, refused to 
openly criticize union leaders, and even defended them from the criticism of 
militants." The party literally took up the cudgels on the bureaucracy's 
behalf by expelling M.A. Mackenzie, editor of the Steelworker, as a 'Trotsky-
ite" and founding the rival Union News under George MacEachem's editor-
ship.^^ 
Salsberg's Montréal intervention may have had nothing to do with earlier 
criticisms of the party's role in industry, but it was nevertheless striking that 
these were not openly addressed —rather contradicting the trade union com-
missar's laudable encouragement of openness with ordinary workers. Was 
Salsberg's underlying message that rank-and-file comrades — even in this 
new, open mode — should present a strictly authorized version of the creed? 
One should not assume that, when party leaders criticized the lower ranks for 
submerging themselves in their unions, that their criticism always came from 
the left or was perceived that way. Party members who observed strict 
discipline must sometimes have found themselves standing uneasily to the 
right of the very militants who were most likely to be attracted to left-wing 
politics. 
The European Crisis: What Shall Canada Do? 
It was axiomatic to the popular front project that every advance towards "true 
democracy" was endangered by the looming prospect of world war. Wide 
discussion of the question of what Canadians should do in the event of war in 
Europe was largely the result of CPC prompting. Mackenzie King, having 
struck a private deal at the 1937 Commonwealth Conference to support 
Britain's position unconditionally, made it his "supreme endeavour" to "let no 
hasty or premature threat or pronouncement create mistrust and divisions" 
the intensity of their campaigns for independent labour political action in the face of a 
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between Canada's disparate social elements and actively discouraged public 
debate.^' In the country at large, however, it was widely assumed that Canada 
would follow Britain. Thus, the CPC's main objective was to exert pressure 
on Mackenzie King to persuade Neville Chamberlain to abandon appeasement 
in favour of the USSR's "positive peace" policy. Only collective security, it 
argued, would "quarantine the aggressors" and remove the danger of war. 
Although the party was less clear about what Canada should do if diplomacy 
failed (a fuzziness that helped keep "several thousand" principled pacifists in 
the party and many more in the democratic front), the Anti-Comintern Pact 
had strengthened the universal assumotion that the USSR would be the main 
target in any war started by Germany. Moreover, the very strong implication 
of all CPC propaganda was that fascism — and especially Nazism — was so 
bestial that any Leninist reservations about imperialist war would have to set 
aside. The entire logic of the party's position pointed towards the CPC's 
original decision in September 1939: "this is our war." 
Throughout 1938 the party strived to persuade the "democratic masses" 
that the Canadian people and the Soviet Union were natural allies. Provided 
that fascism could be contained at home and abroad, Canadian democracy 
would naturally evolve towards the superior form of Soviet socialist democ-
racy. If fascism could not be contained, party propaganda strongly implied 
that the same democratic alliance could defeat it. As the USSR's active combat 
role in Spain (used, of course, by the bourgeois press to attack the legitimacy 
of the popular struggle) proved, "peace-loving" did not mean pacifist. All the 
party's campaigns against the "fascist aggressors" played heavily on a sense 
of outrage at, and absolute moral superiority over, fascist barbarism. Hitherto 
focused on Spain ("the cause of democratic Spain is the cause of humanity," 
Clarté insisted), these sentiments were sustained by hostility to appeasement. 
Especially after Munich, the party expressed its fury at the "Chamberlain 
betrayal" of Czechoslovakia in print and from numerous public platforms. 
In Winnipeg, the Young Communist League outraged the authorities by 
burning Hitler in effigy during a picket of the German consular offices. A 
popular front meeting in the same city a few days later expressed its indigna-
tion more augustly: from a platform that included local party leader Leslie 
Morris, Mayor John Queen, former-Judge Lawrence St. George Stubbs, R.C. 
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McCuthchan of the trades and labour council, and several representatives of 
the party's German and Czechoslovak language groups, came an expression 
of "full sympathy" with the Czech people and a demand for the immediate 
recall of parliament. Similar meetings were held across Canada. BC provin-
cial secretary Malcolm Bruce wrote that the "situation today is different from 
that of 1914 and [makes] it possible to resist fascism and remove it from the 
face of the earth." 
Munich, however, was a clear defeat for Soviet diplomacy and, from 
Moscow's perspective, the popular front strategy. Over the following winter 
Moscow began to drop hints of its waning support for the popular front. These 
were promptly picked up by party leaders in the west. In October, for example, 
Buck, who had left for Europe with Earl Browder shortly after Munich, joined 
other CP leaders in Paris and issued an anti-appeasement manifesto, calling 
again for a pact of the "peace forces" (Britain, France, the United States, and 
the USSR) and issuing a last appeal for solidarity with the dying Spanish 
republic (the International Brigades were already homeward bound). A re-
markable feature of the manifesto was a sharp attack on social democracy (late 
in 1937 Dimitrov had dropped a hint that this might be on the way). In terms 
somewhat reminiscent of the Third Period, the Labour and Socialist Interna-
tional and the International Federation of Trade Unions were declared spe-
cially culpable for Munich. The party heads invited the "proletarians of all 
lands" to force the leaders of social democracy to support an international 
conference to reorganize the anti-fascist struggle. In November the ECCI 
issued another manifesto, emphasizing the need for "working class unity" as 
the "foundations of Unity of the Peoples Against Fascist Aggression." While 
these declarations did not dispose of the popular front, it appeared likely that 
the scene was already being set for the Nazi-Soviet Pact and an imperialist 
interpretation of the war. 
In April 1938 Buck had rather mysteriously told members of the central 
committee not to be surprised by any development on the international front. 
Nevertheless, there was no indication a year later that the man whose intema-
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tional contacts were the best in the party knew what was being hatched in the 
Kremlin. Indeed, as appeasement crumbled in the wake of Hitler's annexation 
of Czechoslovakia, Buck stated in a radio broadcast that the party had 
concretely studied the international situation and — on a Leninist basis — 
decided that a war between "fascist aggression" and "democracy" would be a 
just war, even though the "two camps" of peace (implicitly excluding the 
USSR) and war were "imperialist." Come the day, the party would "participate 
loyally" and bring the war to a "speedy and victorious conclusion." For the 
next four months the party had little to add. And then came the first 
bombshell. The comrades who wrote the Clarion's first editorial on the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact were obviously in the dark about the Moscow line but their 
first instinct was to defend the Soviet Union. Over the next few weeks they 
constructed an increasingly detailed apologia, their main arguments being 
that: the Soviet Union had been forced into the Pact because of Britain's 
reluctance to support collective security; the Pact was not a surprise, since 
Britain had known about German-Soviet negotiations for six months; it was 
the most limited of agreements; and it was a triumph for the struggle against 
fascism, for not only would it free the Soviet Union to lend more assistance 
to China, but the dispelling of the myth that the USSR was a threat to Germany 
would inspire the German people to launch their own struggle for "peace, 
freedom and democracy." 
As disgust followed confusion, many communists, particularly Jewish 
comrades, left the party. Nevertheless, as the RCMP reported, party discipline 
and the bottom line argument that the Soviet Union (a) knew what it was doing 
and (b) had no alternative, held the ranks together. What helped even more 
was that the party line on the nature of the war itself did not change. When 
Hitler blitzed western Poland, Buck wrote to Mackenzie King promising "full 
support to the Polish people in their resistance to Nazi aggression" and the 
party's Spanish Civil War commissars, Ed Cecil-Smith and William Kardash, 
offered to place the expertise of the MacPap veterans at the disposal of the 
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1939. 
go 
Alice Cooke asked "Can Canada Care for British Children?" Daily Clarion, 12 
August 1939 and answered in the affirmative, confident that Canada would handle 
evacuation more efficiently and in a more egalitarian manner than in Britain. She urged 
the federal government to launch immediately the construction of camps to house 
British evacuees, which, in the event of a peaceful resolution of the European conflict, 
could then be used as holiday camps for needy Canadian children. 
'^Clarion, 26 August and 2, 16 September 1939. 
Weisbord, The Strangest Dream, 100-1 ; Palmer, A Communist Life, 54. 
26 THE DEPRESSION YEARS, PART V 
Department of National Defence.'°' Although the political bureau adopted a 
position of "unequivocal opposition" to Canada's involvement in the war as 
early as 9 September, for a variety of reasons it took until 14 October to issue 
a clear statement of that fact. Meanwhile, with Canada in the war, many 
party members remained in the dark about the leadership's change of heart 
and "conducted their political activities according to their own interpretation 
of events." One seventeen year-old comrade, "unemployed and full of anti-
fascist fire," immediately went to join the army and found himself in a line-up 
with veterans, unemployed men, and "a whole bunch of bloody commu-
nists." The party's decision to oppose the war — so obviously at the behest 
of the Soviet Union and so dramatically at odds with five years of anti-fascist 
propaganda — was the more devastating bombshell. 
Conclusion 
In important respects the RCMP's analysis of popular frontism was profoundly 
accurate. When the party showed that its ultimate loyalty was not to Canada 
and democracy but to an anti-democratic, foreign power, who could deny that 
CPC leaders saw the strategy essentially as "a temporary expedient?" 
Nevertheless, the popular front amounted to much more than the RCMP's 
limited analysis could comprehend. Here the concept of "two parties" makes 
particular sense. There "was," as Bryan Palmer stresses, "a Party ruled by the 
bureaucratic sycophants of StaHn ... [and also] a party that people joined the 
better to intervene in the class struggles of the twentieth century." The vast 
majority of the tens of thousands of men, women, and children who, whether 
in the party or in the movement, were mobilized by the popular front had not 
the slightest inkling that events unfolding in central Europe would discredit 
their participation in a movement that appeared to be bringing "true democ-
racy" to Canada. Many party members were caught up in the thrill of being 
the vital spark of this mass struggle to deepen and extend Canadian democracy, 
not least within the party. Their experience of this more consultative, respon-
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sive, and apparently accountable party made the events of August and Sep-
tember 1939 all the more unbearable and their sense of betrayal that much 
greater. Would they have been so dazed and horrified by the Hitler-Stalin Pact 
had their anti-fascist and democratic convictions been only skin-deep? 
Continuous activism had helped conceal the many tensions and ambiguities 
in the popular front. Many rank-and-file members must have wondered how 
to reconcile the party's claims to be democratic, committed to peaceful 
change, and revolutionary. They may also have wondered why, if becoming 
Canadian was so vital, the party continued to sing the praises of the Soviet 
Union so fiilsomely and so often. Both contradictions were highlighted in the 
summer of 1939 when the state banned the sale of the recently published 
History of the CPSU (B) Short Course on the grounds that the public had to 
be protected from a text that preached "force and violence and is therefore 
seditious." This book, in essence a recasting of Stalin's version of Leninism 
in grand narrative form, culminated in a panegyric to Stalin and a defence of 
the show trials. Since the latter had dented the Soviet halo, the Short Course 
108 had to be defended. Norman Freed, one of the party's foremost dialecticians 
agreed that the party (which had imported 25,000 copies for internal educa-
tional work) was offering it as a viable model of the Canadian road to 
socialism. He disputed, however, the state's gloss on its message. What the 
Short Course really showed was the usually peaceful, democratic nature of 
the Bolshevik revolution. Why, "the very transfer of power ... to the workers 
and peasants was carried through in the most democratic manner," while the 
blood spilt during the Civil War was not the fault of the bolsheviks but of a 
"dying capitalist class." Thus, the Short Course deserved a place in the 
pantheon of literary democracy stretching from Thomas More's Utopia to 
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle. Every such apologetic came back to haunt the 
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party later in the year, when Moscow's exposure as a practitioner of business 
as usual rather than the guardian of humanity removed one of the strongest 
reasons for being a communist. 
Whether the popular front was leading the working class away from rather 
than towards socialism is impossible to answer. There is no way of knowing 
how it might have evolved — although it is worth speculating that the potential 
was there for the CPC to become the sort of "Labour-Progressive Party" that 
the CCF, the beneficiary of its failures (not to mention the Cold War), never 
truly became — a mass social reformist party on the model of the post-Lib-
eration French or Italian CPs. What we can say is that the party's fetishization 
of unity led to tactical decisions that were inappropriate to the revolutionary 
workers' party the CPC still claimed to be. Trade-offs may have been ines-
capable, but the CPC voluntarily surrendered the Leninist right to criticize its 
allies when they veered too far from the path of class struggle. We still lack a 
full account of the party's relations with the progressive middle class, but the 
moral of its handover of labour defence to the CCLU may be that, while 
middle-class allies could be useful, it was unwise to depend on them; some 
progressives managed to hold on to their agenda while wearing communist 
pyjamas. As in other countries, "militancy at the base clashed with the 
circumspection of the leadership." 
In its contribution to labour struggles, the party comfortably out-performed 
its rivals while standing "with the workers" less consistently than one might 
have expected. The official CPC history, not a text given to revisionist critique, 
acknowledges that the party's "intense preoccupation" with keeping the TLC 
and CIO united "contributed to a temporary decline in union membership 
during the 1938-40 period." Placating the progressive labour bureaucracy 
may also have contributed to restricting the number of union militants who 
became or remained communists. 
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As the events of August through October 1939 established, the CPC's 
ultimate betrayal of Leninism lay in allowing the broad lines of its policy to 
be determined not by an examination of objective possibilities but by the 
"erratic directives of the distant heads of world Communism who could not 
have cared less" about the fate of Canada, Canadian workers, or the Canadian 
113 Communist Party. Arguably, the CPC never recovered from performing 
like a circus dog in fall 1939. Undoubtedly, in the last analysis, the 
Comintern was the RCMP's best friend. 
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